Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 15
Issue 1 Symposium on Legal Education

Article 11

February 2014

Southern Christian: A Call for Extra-Constitutional
Remedies, Legal Clinical Education, and Social
Justice
Frances M. Nicastro

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
Recommended Citation
Frances M. Nicastro, Southern Christian: A Call for Extra-Constitutional Remedies, Legal Clinical Education, and Social Justice, 15 Notre
Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 333 (2001).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol15/iss1/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

SOUTHERN CHRISTLAN: A CALL FOR EXTRACONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES, LEGAL CLINICAL
EDUCATION, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
FRANCES

M.

NICASTRO*

INTRODUCTION

The aim of the law clinics and the dedication of their staffs
and students are indeed laudable. They should be commended for their enthusiasm, hard work, and willingness
to devote time and effort toward altruistic endeavors. The
[district court] recognizes the pronounced degree of
anger, angst, and frustration they are experiencing as a
result of [the Louisiana Supreme Court's] alteration in the
[student] practice rules. To [the staff and students of law
clinics], such a change appears unfair. However, unfair-

ness does not always automatically rise to the level of
unconstitutionality. Indeed, it rarely does.'
In July 1999, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana granted a defendant's motion to dismiss a plaintiff's
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and for lack of standing.2 Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Louisiana Chapter, et aL v. Supreme Court of the State
of Louisianaheld that none of the plaintiff-constituencies stated a
claim upon which the court could grant relief when the plaintiffs

claimed that the Louisiana Supreme Court's amendment to the
State's student practice rule violated rights guaranteed by the

First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu* B.S., 1998, Cornell University, School of Industrial & Labor Relations;
J.D. Candidate, 2001, Notre Dame Law School; 1999-2001 Thomas J. White
Scholar. I am grateful to my parents, Elizabeth F. and Charles J. Nicastro who
have encouraged me in all of my endeavors. I would also like to give heartfelt
thanks to Professor Lucy S. Payne for her comments and insights on the topic
of legal education reform, as well as her invaluable research assistance. Much
gratitude is also owed to Professor Thomas L. Shaffer, whose expertise in
clinical teaching inspires not only me, but all of the students who work in the
Legal Aid Clinic at Notre Dame.
1. Southern Christian Leadership Conference, La. Chapter, et al. v. Sup.
Ct. of La., 61 F. Supp. 2d 499, 513 (E.D. La. 1999) [hereinafter Southern
Christian].
2. See id. at 501.
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tion.3 The district court acknowledged that the movant's burden
for a 12(b) (6) motion was heavy.4 Nevertheless, the court found
the plaintiffs' complaint failed to set forth deprivation of any protected interest because "[n] onlawyers have no constitutional or
legal right to represent individuals or organizations in courts or
before administrative tribunals."5
Southern Christianteaches a couple of very important lessons.
First, the United States Constitution is not the ultimate arbiter of
what is fair. Instead, teachers, students, and citizens living in a
society dominated by law, politics, and economics, must strive to
utilize extra-constitutional means for achieving their laudable
goals. Southern Christianis a stark reminder that while the American legal system often protects those behaviors and social institutions that are desirable, merely because a behavior or social
institution is desirable does not mean that it gains the law's protection. Some things are beyond its scope. Second, Southern
Christianhighlights the success that law school clinical programs
can have in meeting the educational needs of law students, as
well as the legal needs of underserved communities. It provides
a springboard to consider whether, perhaps, law schools across
the country ought to strengthen, if not mandate, clinical legal
programs in their curriculum. These lessons are understood
only after careful examination of the Southern Christianopinion
and a structured review of what clinical legal programs have to
offer indigent clients, students of the law, and society at large.
In pursuit of this end, this Comment describes the facts and
circumstances that prompted the plaintiffs to bring suit in Southern Christian. Each of the plaintiff-constituencies' claims is
examined in an effort to show that the district court's opinion
was a proper application of constitutional law. Despite the
court's holding, there are multiple solutions that the plaintiffconstituencies may pursue to achieve their ends in lieu of further
appeal.
Moving away from the specific circumstance in Southern
Christian,Part III of this Comment elaborates on the role of legal
clinics in today's society; explaining how clinical programs have
developed over time, can serve low-income clients, and can teach
students about career opportunities in the legal profession. Part
III ends by arguing that clinical programs, by creating an opportunity to serve underrepresented constituencies, benefit society
at large and all persons in the legal profession.
3.
4.
5.

See id.
See id. at 513.
Id.
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Ultimately, this Comment concludes that law schools across
the country should re-evaluate their current curriculum and consider expanding current clinical programs, perhaps even to the
point of instituting clinical requirements for their students.
Southern Christian is not a barrier to the pursuit of social justice;
rather, the opinion is a call to action, a call to move beyond the
narrow constitutional constructs of what ought to exist, and a call
to improve legal education.
I.

SOUTHERN CHRISTIAv. IMPETUS TO THINK OUTSIDE THE

Box

Southern Christian raises many issues for teachers, students,
and practitioners of the law, as well as for an ordered society,
whose continued existence depends on a base guarantee of social
justice for its people. Ought there exist restrictions governing
the practice of law by students who are not licensed practitioners? If so, how ought the courts and legislature promulgate these
restrictions? Which constitutional rights, if any, attach in these
circumstances?
A.

The Facts

The case of Southern Christianprovides a canvas upon which
to flesh out potential answers to these questions. Like many
other states,6 the Louisiana Supreme Court has adopted a student practice rule to allow for unlicensed law students to assist
selected clients with their legal cases; Rule XX is entitled "Limited Participation of Law Students in Trial Work."7 The rule is
divided into many sections; sections 1, 4, and 5 provide the main
source of debate in this case.
Section 1 stands for three propositions. First, it is primarily
the responsibility of the "bench and bar" to supply legal services
to the public at large, including those persons who are unable to
afford such services. Second, to assist in that task, the Louisiana
court adopted Rule XX, allowing law students some ability to perform legal services. Third, Rule XX was also intended to
"encourage law schools to provide clinical instruction in trial work
of various kinds."8 Originally, the rule permitted eligible law students to represent the State, its subdivisions, or any indigent person; the Louisiana Supreme Court, however, subsequently
6. See David F. Chavkin, Am I My Client's Lauyer?: Role Definition and the
Clinical Supervisor,51 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1546-54 (1998) for a list of citations to
student practice rules of individual states and a summary of the key features of
such rules.
7. Southern Christian, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 501 (citing LA. SuP. CT. R. XX).
8. Id. (emphasis added).
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amended the rule to include indigent community organizations
among the potential clients that students could represent.'
The controversy in Southern Christianarose when the Louisiana Supreme Court amended the rule further. The court set a
standard by which to determine whether a potential client qualifies as "indigent"; section 4 allows representation of any "individual or family unit whose annual income does not exceed 200% of
the federal poverty guidelines established by the Department of
Health and Human Services." 10 This standard, however, does
not apply when the court finds that a client ought to qualify for
assistance from the clinic and so appoints or refers the client to
the clinic.11
Section 5 of the amended rule requires that indigent community organizations certify, in writing, the inability to pay for
legal services; such writing is subject to inspection by the Louisiana Supreme Court. 12 The amended rule sets forth two additional requirements for a community organization to qualify as
indigent. First, at least 51% of the organization's members must
be eligible for legal assistance under section 4.13 Second, the
court also requires the organization to provide information to
the staff of the clinic that shows the organization "lacks, and has
no practical means of obtaining, funds to retain private
counsel."1 4
The enhanced restriction upon indigent community organizations would ultimately cast a pall on the amendments. In fact,
these amendments were imposed after the success of one community organization, with the assistance of a legal clinic organized at Tulane Law School, in preventing a chemical facility from
locating in its area.1" Tulane Environmental Law Clinic
("T.E.L.C.") represented St. James Citizens for Jobs & the Environment ("St. James") in an effort to prevent Shintech Corporation from constructing a chemical facility in the area. 6 The
community group, St. James, opposed Shintech Corporation's
proposed location for two reasons. First, the facilities posed risks
to the health of local inhabitants, as well as to the environment.
Second, the town was already supporting a disproportionate
share of chemical facilities that posed similar environmental and
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See id

Id. at 502.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 501.
See id.
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health risks. 17 T.E.L.C. filed objections with the Environmental
Protection Agency, as well as to the courts arguing that air permits granted by the Louisiana Department of Environmental
Quality ("L.D.E.Q.") violated a Presidential Executive Order on
environmental justice, as well as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.18
Subsequently, Shintech Corporation located
elsewhere.' 9
The plaintiffs in Southern Christianalleged that business and
political leaders, dissatisfied with a loss of business revenue,
exerted pressure on Tulane University, as well as on the Louisiana Supreme Court to tighten regulation on student practice.2"
Whether this casts a pall upon the Louisiana Supreme Court's
decision to amend the student practice rule is open to debate. 2 '
17. See id See also Peter A. Joy, PoliticalInterference with ClinicalLegal Education: Denying Access to Justice, 74 TUL. L. REv. 235, 243 (1999) (explaining that
the "location for the proposed plant was an area with eleven existing chemical
plants and over 130 other industrial plants known as 'Cancer Alley,' a predominantly African-American, lower-income community").
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. Judge Fallon, in dicta, admitted "in Louisiana, where state
judges are elected, one cannot claim complete surprise when political pressure
somehow manifests itself within thejudiciary." Southern Christian,61 F. Supp. 2d
at 513. See alsoJoy, supra note 17, at 240, where the author asserts that "It]he
amendments to the student practice rule were triggered by business groups and
politicians unhappy with the successful legal work of clinical law students and
faculty at the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic (TELC)." The author further
asserts that the business and political constituencies utilized extralegal remedies
to effectuate their goals; "[t]he strategy that ultimately proved most effective
was direct lobbying of Louisiana Supreme Court justices during ajudicial campaign year by business groups and politicians, many of whom had supported
the justices during their previous campaigns." But see Sam A. LeBlanc III, Debate
Over the Law Clinic PracticeRule: Redux, 74 TUL. L. REV. 219, 224 (1999). The
author stated that while the Shintech matter may have been a proximate cause
for the amendment to the practice rules, it was not the sole cause:
Other activities of the TELC over the course of many years provided
substantial fuel for the eventual fire. For instance, law clinic practitioners had been involved in objecting to a number of facilities being
expanded in the state, had lobbied on the issue of an environmental
'scoreboard' as a prerequisite for the industrial tax exemption historically given to business to encourage capital development in the state,
and fought against planned infrastructure improvements, such as the
Industrial Canal Locks, for many years. The bases for the objections
or positions were perceived by many to be merely pretextual. The
organizations represented by the TELC were perceived as sham organizations created strictly for the purpose of opposing projects or as
local organizations affiliated with national organizations that could
well afford to pay for legal representation.
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Possible economic and political motivations aside, the central
issue before the Louisiana District Court was whether the claimants had any grounds upon which to sustain a claim that the
amendments to the practice rule violated provisions of the First
or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
B.

The Legal Questions

Plaintiffs asserted eight specific bases for relief.2 2 The district court's opinion tackled the claims of each plaintiff-constituency in turn. There were four constituencies including clients of
T.E.L.C., a donor of financial support to T.E.L.C., the professors
affiliated with T.E.L.C., and the students who participated in
T.E.L.C.
1. The Client-Plaintiffs
Ten community organizations claimed that the new clinic
regulations deprived them of the ability to speak, associate, and
petition the government freely and that the disclosure requirements infringed upon their right to collective activity because
such disclosure had the tendency to expose their members to
retaliation, thereby creating a chilling effect upon a member's
desired association. 2 3 "In essence, the client-plaintiffs' complaint
[was] that the manner in which Rule XX constrict[ed] the operation of law clinics interfer[ed] with [the community organizations'] ability to exercise their constitutional rights in a legal
forum."2 The community organizations' argument rested upon
the fact that they could not express their concerns in a legal
forum without
representation by counsel, which was limited by
25
Rule XX.
The district court then faced the initial question of whether,
in a civil context, a right to be represented by counsel attached.
The district court reiterated that "no such right [to counsel]
exists [for the community organizations] in civil cases."2 6
In an effort to support their claim, the plaintiffs relied upon
the principle set forth in In re Primus.2 7 Namely, "representation
of public interest groups organized for the purpose of collective
22. See Southern Christian, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
23. See id. at 506.
24. Id. at 507.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 506 (citing Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Sardone, 94 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1996); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18 (1981)).
27. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
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political expression is amenable to First Amendment protection."28 In re Primus held that a First Amendment right attached
when an attorney advised a lay person of her legal rights and
subsequently sent such lay person notice that free legal assistance
was available from a nonprofit organization, with which the attorney was affiliated.2 9
Just as the rule limiting the attorney's solicitation of an indigent client in In re Primus fell under First Amendment protections, perhaps the disclosure requirements now levied on the
community organizations ought also to fall under First Amendment protections, such that the restrictions must cede to First
Amendment rights of association. In both instances, a party was
facing a legitimate regulation: limited solicitation by attorneys
and limited disclosure requirements for clinic participation. And
in both instances, the moving parties sought to have those
requirements cede to broader First Amendment rights of
association.
The key distinguishing feature between the two situations,
however, is the posture of the parties. In re Primus dealt with a
licensed attorney approaching potential clients. The adversarial
legal system is premised on rights of association between licensed
attorneys and clients. In Southern Christian,however, the district
court dealt with unlicensed law students forming representational relationships with clients. Unlicensed law students have
no associational rights in a legal forum except for those granted
by a state court's discretion and guidance."
In fact, In re Pimus supports the district court's opinion.
The holding of In re Primus assured that a licensed attorney was
able to associate with indigent clients. Similarly, Rule XX allows
licensed attorneys in the clinical programs to solicit and exercise
First Amendment associational rights with any indigent client,
should they so choose.

28. Southern Christian,61 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (discussing the plaintiffs' reliance on In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) and NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963)).
29. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 421.
30. See LeBlanc III, supranote 21, at 231. The author explains that one of
the most important questions presented in Southern Christian is fundamental:
who ought to be eligible to provide clients with legal assistance? The author
asserted that in "a day and age when anybody can do anything, this might seem
to be profoundly irrelevant. On the other hand, to individuals who seriously
respect the law, it is [an] essential [inquiry]." Id.
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The Donor-Plaintiffs

Also relying on First Amendment freedoms, a donor to
T.E.L.C. claimed that Rule XX impinged his right to "express
and advance his beliefs. '3 1 The district court noted that the
donor's position "seemed to be that the burden at issue was not
the imposition of a particular spending limit, but the way in
which Rule XX controlled how funds were spent." 32 The district
court stressed that Rule XX did not prevent the donor from contributing to his choice of community organizations directly. "At
most, the donor-plaintiff s objection [was] that Rule XX
restrict[ed] his ability to channel funds to their ultimate recipients, the community groups, in the manner he [saw] fit." 3 3 The
district court explained that none of the cases submitted by the
plaintiffs supported this contention.3 4
Plaintiffs cited, among other cases, Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FederalElection Commission, in support
of their contention. In Colorado Republican, the United States
Supreme Court held that expenditures for radio advertisements,
although reflecting poorly on opposing party's candidate, were
spent independently of any specific candidate's campaign
scheihe and not pursuant to any general or particular understanding with a candidate. 6 In this circumstance, the Court held
that a political expenditure provision could not limit the amount
spent on such independent radio advertisements because to do
so would violate First Amendment rights.3 7
In Southern Christian, however, the plaintiff was free to
donate unlimited contributions directly to the legal clinic of his
choice. Although Rule XX restricted a clinic's choice of clientele, a donor was free to contribute the funds directly to the community organization of his choice. Accordingly, no First
Amendment right was denied to the donor.
31. Southern Christian,61 F. Supp. 2d at 508.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 509 (explaining that the court did "not read any of the cases
cited by Plaintiffs to stand for the proposition that a donor has a constitutional
right to demand that funds he supplies be expended in a certain way, particularly when the complained of regulation burdens the conduit (i.e., TELC), and
not the ultimate recipient" of the donation).
35. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., et al. v. Fed. Election
Comm'n., 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
36. See id. at 613.
37.

See id.
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The Professor-Plaintiffs

The law professors claimed that the amendments to Rule
XX inhibited their ability to "engage students in... the types of
cases which afford the best possible teaching and learning opportunities. They insist[ed] that this burden[ed] their constitutional rights to freedom of association with students, freedom of
speech, and academic freedom."3 ' Reviewing the facts of the
case, the district court was "of the opinion that, at its core, the
professor-plaintiffs' grievance [was] that the Amendments
deprive [d] them of the freedom to instruct and employ law students in whatever fashion they desire[d]. " " The law faculty
could not object to any impingement upon their own right to
advance any theory or idea in the classroom. The terms and
effect of Rule XX created no such restriction. The law faculty
instead claimed that Rule XX "intrude[d] upon a derivative
right, one drawn from the supposed freedom of law students to
obtain a clinical 4education
in the manner that is most pedagogi0
cally beneficial."
In response, the district court explained that Rule XX
merely placed a restriction on the law faculty's ability to employ a
student in a representative capacity. Rule XX did not prevent
the law faculty from representing or soliciting clients of their
choice, or from employing students in any nonrepresentative
capacity. As a matter of principle and legal process, the district
court stressed that "[i]f it is within the province of the Louisiana
Supreme Court to erect boundaries to student practitioners'
authority to appear in court, then it is also appropriate for the
same limitations to govern how professors direct those students."4 The district court, therefore, found the professor-plaintiffs to have suffered no cognizable injury.42
Indeed, the authority that the professor-plaintiffs presented
to support their claim was readily distinguishable from the case
at bar. Professor-plaintiffs cited Edwards v. Aguillard4 "for the
proposition that courts apply exacting scrutiny to legislative
attempts to 'interfere with the ability of teachers to educate in
the manner they deem appropriate."'" In Edwards, the Supreme
Court of the United States ruled on whether a legislative act,
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
Univ. of

Southern Christian,61 F. Supp. 2d at 509.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 510.
See id.
Edwards et al. v. Aguillard et al., 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
Southern Christian, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 509 (also citing Regents of the
Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
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requiring schools to teach creation science if and when evolution
theories were taught, violated the Establishment Clause.4 5 The
Court upheld the court of appeals decision that the "actual
intent [of the requirement] was 'to discredit evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of creationism, a religious belief."' 4 6
In applying a three-prong test to hold that the statute did
violate the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court explained
that "[s] tates and local school boards are generally afforded considerable discretion in operating public schools."4 7 In this sense,
the professor-plaintiffs gained support for their claim that any
legislative infringement upon their teaching methods must be
scrutinized. The case at bar, however, did not have the direct
relationship that existed in Edwards. In Southern Christian, Rule
XX did not restrict the subject matters that professors might
teach. It merely limited the ways in which law faculty could
assign students to clients participating in the legal clinic.
Through an indirect limit on the professors' ability to teach students by assignment, the historical principles behind judicial
constraints on the ability of non-lawyers to practice law justify the
incidental restraint.
Precedent in Louisiana4" explains why it is proper and desirable that the legislature and the court have a hand in determining eligibility requirements for the practice of law. The
Louisiana Supreme Court explained:
The Legislature may, in the exercise of its police power,
and in the performance of its duty to protect the public
against imposition or incompetence on the part of persons
professing to be qualified to practice the so-called learned
professions, fix minimum qualifications or standards for
admission to the bar. But the courts of justice have,
besides that interest, another and special interest, in the
character and qualifications of the members of the barwho are considered in this country as officers of the courts.
In fact, a proper administration of justice depends as
largely upon the conscience, competence and conduct of
the members of the bar, as upon the work of the men on
the bench.4 9
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 583.
Ex parte Steckler et al., 154 So. 41 (1934).
Id. at 45.
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The district court supported its decision by describing the
absurd consequences of providing law professors a carte blanche
to employ tactics of their choice to educate their students.50 But
a simpler analogy exists that illustrates more poignantly the policy behind licensing requirements. First, imagine if First Amendment rights inhered to give educators in other professions
unlimited discretion in their teaching assignments. Then, apply
this principle to a scenario in which a medical student is participating in an outpatient clinical program. Merely because her
professor believes that the student would benefit from unfettered
discretion to prescribe certain medicines and perform certain
medical procedures does not, and should not, prevent the governing medical board from interceding and placing reasonable
restrictions upon this discretion. If it did, patients' medical care
might be sacrificed to the misjudgment of an unlicensed medical
student. Similarly, while the court recognizes the utility of student practice in legal clinics, it also must balance this learning
tool against the broader societal protections at stake, that is, that
clients ought to have competent representation.
4. The Student and Student-Organization Plaintiffs
The plaintiffs agreed that there does not exist any fundamental right of a non-lawyer to practice law; the plaintiffs also
agreed that courts possess the inherent power to regulate both
lawyers and clinical law student practice.5 1 The students argued,
however, that the power to regulate the clinical law student prac50. See Southern Christian,61 F. Supp. 2d at 510, where the opinion states:
Taken to its logical conclusion, the right the faculty implores this
Court to recognize is one that bestows upon professors unfettered discretion to instruct students, not only in the classroom but also in the
.real-world" context, in whatever manner they choose so long as the
professors feel it is the most pedagogically beneficial. Under this theory, a professor supervising a criminal law clinic might determine that
the best educational experience for students would be to first learn

how it feels to be a criminal and to spend time incarcerated. If the
Louisiana Supreme Court then amended Rule XX to prohibit student
practitioners from any activity that might constitute a crime, this
would automatically burden the professor's constitutional rights.
While this may actually be true in a purely theoretical sense, it is clear
that the State could constitutionally proscribe such behavior. In this
case, the Rule XX Amendments more narrowly define the students'
already limited privilege to engage in what would otherwise be the
unauthorized practice of law. To place restrictions on such a privilege
burdens the professor's rights no more than the above hypothetical
proscription against criminal law clinic students engaging in criminal
activity.
51.

See id.
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tice must not violate the United States Constitution.5" "The students and student organizations object[ed] that Rule XX
infringe[d] their constitutional rights because it detract[ed]
from their educational opportunities and burden[ed] their ability to associate and advocate for expression of collective views"; in
this way, the students argued that they had suffered
"a concrete,
53
particularized injury to a protected interest."
In response, the district court focused almost exclusively on
the propriety of the income restriction created by Rule XX. The
court explained that "[c] ourts routinely uphold the utilization of
income levels as criteria for conditioning certain public benefits."5 4 The students tried to distinguish their case by showing
that "all of [the district court's cited] decisions somehow
involved the use of public funds," but the Tulane clinic received
only private funds. 55 The district court found the distinction
unpersuasive; in sum, the court explained:
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court does not offer
public funding for legal services for the poor, through the
mechanism of Rule XX it does supply "labor" for the provision of legal services to the poor. By allowing students to
represent indigents, the State is essentially offering free
assistance through the students themselves, rather than
through public funds. By analogy, then, the State should
be permitted to employ the same guidelines for determining who will receive these limited public resources.5 6
The district court went on to explain why the restriction conformed to both constitutional law and the policy behind the student practice rule. "Rule XX has always had a public service
orientation, one geared towards supplying needed legal services
to those least able to pay for them. Without any income criteria
whatsoever for determining who might qualify for aid, it is conceivable that
the poor themselves might not receive any legal
57
assistance."
What is interesting is that the opinion lacks any discussion of
the due process rights that may have required that the Louisiana
Supreme Court provide students either with a pre- or postamendment opportunity to be heard. Though the district court
52.
53.
54.

See id. at 511.
Id. at 510.
Id. at 511.

55.
56.

Id.
Id.

57.

Id. at 512.
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opinion cited Bass v. Perrin5" for the proposition that "there is no
constitutional right to legal representation in a civil case,"5 9
review of the case raises an interesting question about due
process.
In Bass, the Eleventh Circuit asked whether the decision to
deprive a prison inmate of outdoor exercise time could hold
potential due process implications.6" The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment protects against deprivations of
"life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 6 1 Since a
prisoner is already deprived of his or her liberty "in the ordinary
sense of the term," it is difficult to determine whether process is
due when there are alterations
made to the already sanctioned
62
deprivation of liberty.
The Eleventh Circuit opinion set out two circumstances in
which process may be due for a subsequent deprivation of liberty.
First, "when a change in a prisoner's conditions of confinement
is so severe that it essentially exceeds the sentence imposed by
the court," process may be due.6 3 Second, "when the state has
consistently given a certain benefit to prisoners (for instance, via
statute or administrative policy), and the deprivation of that benefit 'imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,"' process may be
due.6 4 "In the first situation, the liberty interest exists apart from
the state; in the second situation, the liberty interest is created by
the state."6 5
In Bass, the Eleventh Circuit found that the inmates had a
liberty interest in outdoor exercise time. This constituted a liberty interest created by the state. 66 Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit found no due process infringement because the inmates
who were deprived of exercise time were provided with, and took
advantage of, a full appeals process.
One might question whether the law students in Southern
Christian could rely on a similar principle. The students could
argue that Rule XX constituted a state-created property right, a
right of students to represent individuals and organizations
58. Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312 (1lth Cir. 1999).
59. Southern Christian, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 506.
60. Bass, 170 F.3d at 1315.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
62. Bass, 170 F.3d at 1318.
63. Id. at 1318 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) and
Vitek v. Jones 445 U.S. 480, 492-93 (1980)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id.
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under a broad and fluid criteria of indigency. Then, the students
could assert that the subsequent amendment of Rule XX diluted
this right.
While the district court explained that "[n]onlawyers have
no constitutional or legal right to represent individuals or organizations in courts or before administrative tribunals," the district
court admits that "Rule XX authorize[d] law students in clinics
to do so [if only] on a limited basis."6 7 An analogy may be drawn
to the inmates who had no constitutional or legal right to liberty,
in the ordinary sense of the word. Once the penal system
allowed them circumscribed freedom, such as daily outdoor exercise time, the system had created a liberty interest. Perhaps, the
Louisiana Supreme Court created some property interest in students' ability to practice law, albeit in a defined manner.
While no one disputes the Louisiana Supreme Court's ability
to alter those rights,6 8 it might be useful to inquire whether the
court acted properly in the manner by which it altered those
rights. If a property right attached to those students who enjoyed
the more broad terms of former Rule XX, what process was due
in altering that rule? In an article describing the controversy,
one author pointed out the peculiar fact that there appeared to
be no laws or court rules in Louisiana that required the court to
open its amendment process to the public.6 9 "There were no
public hearings or a public comment period concerning the proposed changes to the student practice rule, nor were there any
public proceedings or deliberations of the Louisiana Supreme
Court over the requests for changes to the student practice
rule."7 °
If there was no appeal process, then it appears tenable that
the student-plaintiffs may sustain a due process claim against the
Louisiana Supreme Court. In fact, there did appear to exist a
viable appellate process. The students could have appealed to
the political process. As the district court pointed out, the plaintiffs' efforts "would more properly [have been] focused on the
political rather than the legal system." 7 ' The district court ended
its opinion by declaring that "Rule XX Amendments are not
vague or overly broad, and they represent a constitutional exercise of the Louisiana Supreme Court's authority."72
67.

Southern Christian, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 513.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See id. at 510.
SeeJoy, supra note 17, at 247.
Id.
Southern Christian, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 513.
Id. at 514.
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THE FIRST LESSON OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN, EFFECTIVE
ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION ABOUND

It is interesting to see professors and students of the law
focus almost exclusively on constitutional protections to shield
them from hardship that the amendment to Rule XX might work
upon them. There were, and are, alternative channels by which
the plaintiffs could have achieved their desired end. For example, the plaintiffs could have proposed a referendum or asked
that Rule XX be amended to include public comment procedures. Also, the plaintiffs could have requested that the Louisiana Supreme Court consider amending Rule XX to authorize,
for the first time, the providing of services to non-profit organizations, with a separate list of eligibility requirements. 73 Southern
Christianis a call for legal scholars to recognize that the Constitution is not the only measure to ensure fairness. The case is also a
testament to the success of legal clinics. It raises the question of
how legal clinics fit into the present and future of legal
education.
Before such a conclusion can be reached, however, the
needs of various constituencies must be examined. Can legal aid
clinics serve as effective educational tools for law students? Do
legal aid clinics serve clients in an effective fashion? What impact
will more widespread utilization of legal aid clinics hold for
society?
III.

THE BIGGER PICTURE: THE SECOND LESSON OF SOUTHERN
CHRISTIAN IS THAT CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION IS
EFFECTIVE AND UPON INVESTIGATION SERVES
NOT ONLY ITS CLIENTS, BUT LAW
STUDENTS AND SOCIETY AT LARGE

What follows is an explanation of how clinical legal education has developed in the United States. This Comment then
explains how clinical education effectively educates students,
effectively serves indigent clients, and meets broader goals of
social justice.
A.

Development of Clinical Legal Education in the United States

When researching the development of clinical education in
American law schools, two themes dominate. First, legal clinics
are used as tools for achieving professional competency goals.
Second, legal clinics are used as vehicles of social justice for
73.

See LeBlanc III, supra note 21, at 234.
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underserved communities. Inquiry into both reveals that these
roles overlap in many ways and are not mutually exclusive.
Clinical legal programs were initially a response to Harvard
Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell's casebook method of
legal instruction."4 The implementation of the casebook method
replaced apprenticeship requirements for law practice in the late
1800s." 5 Legal clinics were employed to supplement the
"casebook method of legal instruction and to offer law students
experiential learning opportunities similar to the medical school
'
model while providing free legal services to indigent clients. "76
At its birth, clinical legal education focused predominantly on
legal instruction, but also contained a social justice component.
It is interesting that while the implementation of legal clinics posed a substantial question of teaching methodology, most
of the clinics were student-inspired. 77 For example, in 1893, "students at the University of Pennsylvania Law School established
what they called a 'legal dispensary,' borrowing from the terminology of medical education." 71 "Beginning a decade later, clinics were organized at several law schools: the University of
79
Denver, Northwestern University, and Harvard."
The courts stepped in and contributed, in a substantial way,
to the discourse on social justice, when the Supreme Court held
that a defendant had a constitutional right to legal representation in capital cases pending before state courts.8 ° Eventually,
the right to representation was extended to federal capital cases,
felony defendants in state courts, and finally, a right to counsel
81
was recognized for all defendants who risked imprisonment.
Soon after, the social justice aspect of clinical legal education was brought to the forefront during the 1960s and 70s, a
time of social revolution and student activism. 82 "Unprecedented opportunities" for the development of law clinics developed during this time period due to widespread student
74.

SeeJon C. Dubin, ClinicalDesignfor SocialJusticeImperatives, 51 SMU L.

REv. 1461, 1463 (1998). See also Robert MacCrate, Educating a ChangingProfession: From Clinic to Continuum, 64 TENN. L. REv. 1099, 1100 (1997).
75. See Dubin, supra note 74, at 1463.
76. Id.
77. See MacCrate, supra note 74, at 1103.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 1108 (discussing Powell v. Alabama, 237 U.S. 45, 71-72

(1932)).
81.

See generally id. at 1108-09 (discussing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,

463 (1938); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963);
Argensinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30-31, 37 (1972)).
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See Dubin, supra note 74, at 1465.
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demand, as well as financial support from private institutions.A
For example, in 1968 the Ford Foundation committed $12 million, distributed over a ten-year period, to help institute clinical
education as a part of law school curriculum. 4 Ford created the
Council on Legal Education and Professional Responsibility
(C.L.E.P.R.) comprised of representatives from the Association
of American Law Schools (A.A.L.S.) to administer his program. 5
"CLEPR emphasized 'public service aspects of professional
responsibility, as opposed to the more operational aspects of lawyers' ethics.' CLEPR explicitly mandated that funded programs
be not only 'educationally sound and professionally relevant' but
also 'socially progressive.' "6
The president of C.L.E.P.R.
explained it this way:
So far as society is concerned it sorely needs the services
which only law students and their professors can provide in
the great mass of individual cases involving the 'little man'.
...

Fighting forjustice for an individual is essential for the

individual and for society if it is to continue to be a society
worth living in. If lawyers don't do this, who will? And the
regular participants in the machinery ofjustice need incentives to spruce up their own performance and keep the
machinery up to date. One of the best incentives would be
the regular
appearance on the scene of a fresh crop of law
87
students.

In the wave of this development, the American Bar Association (A.B.A.) revised its standards for accreditation of law
schools. Recognizing developments in clinical practice and professional responsibility, the 1973 standards set three objectives
for all students: instruction in subjects in the core curriculum;
training in8 8 professional skills; and instruction in the legal
profession.

Over time, the practice of law has become more complex. A
process of professional differentiation has narrowed the scope of
an attorney's legal work and client representation.8 9 In
83.
84.
85.

Id.
See id.
See id.

86. Id.
87. Id. at 1466 (quoting COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUC. FOR PROF. RESP.,
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM 3 (1969)).

88. See MacCrate, supra note 74, at 1123 (quoting A.B.A.

SEC. OF LEGAL

EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 262-63 (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE
REPORT]).

89.

See id. at 1124-25.
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response, the A.B.A. Section of Legal Education and Admission
to the Bar convened two national conferences. The first conference was held in October of 1987. Participants at the conference
"sought to assess the stage and state of professional skills instruction and clinical legal education."90 "Five months later, in March
of 1988, the A.B.A. convened a second national conference at the
University of Virginia in Charlottesville. This conference connected the law schools directly to the profession at large and was
entitled Legal Education for a Changing Profession."9 1 The keynote address focused not only on the skills-based learning that
law schools must employ, but also on the basic tenet of social
justice that attorneys owe to underserved communities:
[The speaker hoped] that the law schools would seize the
opportunity which [was] theirs to help shape the profession and from the outset of law studies seek to create in
students an awareness that they are headed for a profession that not only expects its members to have certain
learning, skills and competence, but expects them voluntarily to subscribe to a common body of values and assumed
responsibilities which justify the continuation of the profes92
sion's exclusive right to engage in the practice of law.
Subsequently, the A.B.A. commissioned a task force to create a "conceptual vision of the lawyering skills and professional
values that lawyers should seek to acquire."93 The statement of
skills and values included problem solving, legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, factual investigation, communication
(both oral and written), counseling, negotiation, litigation and
dispute resolution procedures, legal organization and management, and resolution of ethical dilemmas.9 4
In pursuit of these ends, the A.B.A. Task Force Report stated
that clinical courses (both simulated and live-client) "occupied
an important place in the curriculum of virtually all A.B.A.approved law schools."9 5 In 1996, the A.B.A. revised accreditation standards requiring law schools to offer adequate opportunities for instruction in professional skills. "This might be
accomplished through clinics or externships."9 6 Left with the
mandate that law schools must advance some sort of "hands-on"
90.
91.

Id. at 1125.
Id.

92. Id. at 1125-26.
93. Id. at 1127.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 1129.
96.

Id.
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education for their students, it remains open to debate which
form the education should take.
Given the history of clinical education, it is clear that it is
aimed not only at increasing the skills of law students, but also
towards meeting the goals of indigent persons. Since there is
also an overarching need for lawyers to provide legal services to
underrepresented communities in society, it appears that clinical
education is the most viable solution to both the legal education
and social justice quandary. To substantiate this claim, however,
two things must be established. First, clinical programs do, in
fact, serve a valuable educational purpose for students. Second,
there exists a need for representation that can be met, in part,
through the use of clinical programs.
B.

Good for Students: Legal Clinics are a Useful Educational Tool
for Adult Learners and May Offer an Opportunityfor
Career Guidance

1. Learning Tools: Real World Practice, Ethics, Multi-Cultural
Awareness
Clinical legal programs provide extremely useful learning
tools for students. First, as legal education presently stands, most
law students find themselves bored by the casebook teaching
method. One empirical study revealed that "the amount of time
spent studying and preparing for class, the frequency of participation in informal discussions, the degree of interest in law
school work, the degree of difficulty experienced with classwork,
and students' emotional reaction to law school" decreases dramatically over time.9 7 "Only 20% of... students surveyed found
their fifth semester to be intellectually stimulating."9 8
The Socratic method, while teaching "students how to analyze the law in a written appellate opinion, a form of the law [lawyers] will often confront in practice," fails to provide students
with a real world context in which to solve problems.9 9 In contrast, clinics introduce students to real world hypotheticals, with
real world clients, and real world interaction between opposing
parties and supposedly neutral judges and magistrates. Furthermore, supervision by professors opens the door to potential men97. Christopher T. Cunniffe, The Casefor the Alternative Third-Year Program,
61 ALB. L. REv. 85, 103 (1997).
98. Id. at 103-04.
99. Jennifer Howard, Learning to "Think Like a Lauyer" Through Experience,
2 CLINICAL L. REv. 167, 172 (1995).
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tor relationships that may not have developed without the
programs.10 0
In addition, clinical programs offer an avenue to teach law
students about social justice. One commentator on the subject
stated:
Although law school graduates as a group exert enormous
influence on public policy, lawyers individually do not necessarily acknowledge this role. The law school-imbued
notion that the practice of law is a technical matter of
value-free representation of a client's best interests-without regard to societal implications-prevails among practicing lawyers. Legal education needs to confront this
narrow vision of legal advocacy not only because it is in
error, but because critical analysis of one's role in the
social and legal systems should10 1be an essential part of any
higher education experience.
Because of the unique way in which adults learn, legal clinics will
likely meet this educational goal.
As adults, law students learn in a different way from children. The following are four characteristics of adult learners: (1)
adults see themselves as independent learners-they choose to
interpret information for themselves, as opposed to relying on an
authority figure's interpretation; (2) adults tend to draw upon
their own experience in interpreting information; (3) adults'
readiness to learn is increased when the learning is related to
"developmental tasks," that is, those steps necessary for them to
perform their social role; and, (4) adult learners are more
inclined to learn only the information that will readily be applied
to situations at hand, as opposed to learning for some future
date. 10 2 "In other words, adults approach learning with a 'problem-centered' frame of mind."'
For this reason, experiential learning opportunities, such as
clinical programs, are those most likely to affect the knowledge
of adults. As experience-based programs, clinical programs offer
a "significant challenge of playing the lawyer role for the first
time . . .that has been found to lead to learning episodes of
100.

See generally Suzanne J. Levitt, Submission of the ClinicalLegal Education

Association to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana Concerningthe Review of the
Supreme Court's Student PracticeRule, 4 CLINICAL L. Rv. 571 (1998).
101. Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory
and the Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. Rv. 37, 41
(1995) (footnotes omitted).

102.
103.

Id. at 47.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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personal significance. '"104 One author cites a Chinese proverb
that explains this theory quite accurately: "Tell me, I forget.
Show me, I may remember. Involve me, and I understand." '
Essentially, by placing law students in a role to help underserved
persons in society, those underserved constituencies become
"real"; they become a legitimate concern to which attention
ought to be paid. This ethical obligation of lawyers is then
understood at the very start of the lawyer's career.
In addition, clinical education can help to develop multicultural sensitivity in law students. It is difficult for casebooks or
simulation exercises to replicate the experience of working
under the supervision of faculty to represent clients whose economic class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, physical or mental ability, or other significant personal characteristics differ from those
of the student.
In such a setting, clinical students not only develop general
practical skills of legal representation, they also increase
the breadth of their knowledge about culturally diverse clientele located outside the social and economic mainstream. In many cases, such representation provides an
excellent vehicle for developing a sensitivity to general
problems of client relations and professional
responsibility. 106

2.

Career Guidance
Furthermore, clinics provide an opportunity for students to
make informed career choices. A study performed at the University of Denver College of Law revealed that participation in a
clinic reinforced students' prior intentions to handle public
interest cases by ninety-six percent.1 0 7 Additionally, 57% of students who had not originally intended to practice any sort of
public interest,
changed their mind as a result of the clinical
8
course.

10

Where the questionnaire granted students the opportunity
to comment on the reason for the change in their intentions, they acknowledged a 'personalization' of the plight
104. Id. at 50.
105.
106.

Id. (footnote omitted).
Charles R. Calleros, Traininga Diverse Student Body for a Multicultural

Society, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 140, 148 (1995).
107. See Sally Maresh, The Impact of ClinicalLegal Education on the Decisions
of Law Students to PracticePublic Interest Law, in EDUCATING FOR JUSTICE: SOCIAL
VALUES AND LEGAL EDUCATION 154, 163 (Jeremy Cooper & Louise G. Trubek
eds., 1997).
108. See id.
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of the poor, a realization that many of their clients needed
representation through no fault of their own, a recognition that the integrity of the judicial system is dependent
on equal access to representation regardless of individual
resources, and that the 'right' to counsel is not an inalienable right.10 9
Furthermore, the other 43% who did not change their minds did
not indicate failure of the program; rather, they were students
who made an informed decision to continue with other pursuits
after gaining exposure to a new career possibility. The next
question is whether an effective learning tool also effectively
serves clients' needs.
C.

Client Benefits: Legal Clinics Provide Effective Assistance to
Low Income Persons

Before advocating that clinics be more widely implemented,
or even a mandatory tenet of each law school's curriculum, it is
important to query whether these programs serve the best interests of indigent clients. In Southern Christian, it appears that
T.E.L.C. succeeded in preventing a business from establishing a
plant that would have negatively impacted health and environment in the proposed locale.110
This case aside, few studies address the standard of legal
assistance afforded by student practitioners. In an effort to fill
this gap, one article compared student performances in the
Criminal Defense Clinic of New York University School of Law
with the representation of attorneys for indigent defendants in
the Criminal Court of the City of New York ("institutional
defenders").1 1 1 The study employed an outcome or result-based
comparison, as well as an "effort expended" comparison. In both
instances, the results demonstrated that students achieved better
outcomes and expended more diligent effort for their clients.1 12
The study focused on product, as well as process.1 1

109. Id. at 164.
110. See discussion supra Part I.A.
111. See Steven Zeidman, SacrificialLambs or the Chosen Few?: The Impact of
Student Defenders on the Rights of the Accused, 62 BROoL L. REv. 853 (1996).
112. See id. at 919.
113. See id. at 863.
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1.

Outcomes Analysis Revealed That Students Achieved More
Favorable Results for Their Clients Than Institutional
Defenders

The study examined two stages of representation-the
arraignment and the post-arraignment." 4 In both stages, the
results indicate that students fared better than licensed attorneys.
"Nearly half of the clients of institutional defenders pleaded
guilty at [the] initial court appearance, as compared with 27% of
the students' clients."1 15 Furthermore, "[i]n those cases where
the defendants pleaded guilty, students negotiated more pleas to
reduced charges, and were slightly more likely to have secured a
non-jail sentence." 6 Lastly, "[of] those cases that involved a bail
determination (i.e., the case was not disposed of by plea or dismissal), students obtained a higher rate of release on
recognizance." 117
In cases not resolved at arraignment, the clients of students
pled guilty less often (37%) than the clients of institutional
defenders (53%).118 In those instances where the clients of students did plead guilty, those clients were substantially more likely
to plead to a lesser charge and receive a noncustodial sentence.'1 9 "Students' clients were 20% more likely to have their
cases dismissed . . .and were half as likely as clients of institu-

tional defenders to receive bench warrants for failing to return to
court."1 20
2.

Lawyer Performance Analysis Also Revealed the Success of
Student Practitioners

Not surprisingly, the favorable outcomes achieved by the students overlapped the fact that the effort expended by the students proved to exceed that expended by institutional defenders.
But comparing lawyering process with performance was difficult
because it is a subjective, qualitative evaluation. "In order to
assess lawyering performance, it [was] necessary first to delineate
the component parts of lawyering ....Several surveys of practicing attorneys [had] attempted to find out what skills they regularly employ[ed] in their law practices." 2' 1 The study ultimately
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See id. at 867.
Id. at 870.
Id.
Id.
Id.

119. Id.
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employed six foci to guide evaluation: interviewing, fact investiga1 22
tion, negotiation, counseling, problem solving, and litigation.
a. Interviewing
While students fared better than institutional defenders in
fact investigation, negotiation, counseling, and problem solving,
the students did exceptionally well in the area of interviewing.
This is salient because "ABA Standards state that 'defense counsel should seek to establish a relationship of trust and confidence
with the accused.' Commentators and courts have also recognized the pivotal nature of the attorney-client relationship. The
to build rapport is in the initial interview of
time to begin trying
2
the defendant.'
There are many reasons for student success in this regard.
First, and probably most fundamental, was that the students did
not have tight time constraints upon which to end the initial client meeting. 121 "Defendants consistently reported that their
conversations with their [institutional defenders] were rushed
and brief."1 25 Furthermore, "[f]aw students [were] better situated to gain the trust and confidence of their clients. Unlike the
appointed counsel scenario... student attorneys [were] obliged
by the terms of the student practice order to solicit a potential
client's consent to student representation."1 26 In effect, the
defendant chooses her advocate, as opposed to accepting
appointed counsel. The defendant then feels that she is an
active participant in the representation.
b.

Fact Gathering

The successful interview also sets the stage for effective fact
gathering. "If an attorney has a relationship of trust and confidence with his or her client, he or she is more apt to learn the
critical facts."' 2 7 Furthermore, "students' lack of familiarity with
courthouse routines liberates their approaches to information
'
gathering." 128

122.
123.
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See id. at 888.
Id. at 890 (footnotes omitted).
See id. at 892.

125. Id. at 892.
126. Id. at 894.
127. Id. at 901.
128. Id. at 903 (explaining that in one case, "a student moved for the
names and addresses of the prosecution's witnesses. The judge granted the
motion readily and noted her surprise that other defense attorneys did not
make the same request. In another case, a student asked a judge to sign sub-
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c. Litigation Skills
Similar findings go for all other foci, except for litigation
skills. "Trial advocacy skills present perhaps the greatest challenge for students. ' 129 This is one shortcoming that clinical programs have worked towards improving and must continue to do
SO.
CONCLUSION

In Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Louisiana Chapter,
et. al. v. Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, the district court
properly held that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon
which the court could grant relief. First, it is clear that there is
not, and as a matter of policy there should not be, an inherent
right of an unlicensed law student to represent clients in a legal
proceeding. Second, to the extent that Louisiana courts, and
courts across the nation, have provided students with such a
right, it should continue to be within the courts' purview to
define such rights. So long as the students are afforded an
opportunity to express their concerns about those restrictions, as
in Southern Christian, there is no due process violation.
The lessons held by Southern Christianare twofold. First, for
the plaintiffs who will surely be disappointed with the court's
holding, the lesson is to look beyond the United States Constitution in search of fairness. Other channels to effect change
abound and should not be ignored. Second, for law schools
across the nation, Southern Christian highlights the positive
aspects that clinical programs hold for law students, underrepresented constituencies, and society at large. That students,
teachers, and practitioners of the law would grasp these lessons
may be a preliminary step towards truly achieving justice for our
society.

poenas for various police reports. Much to the astonishment of everyone in the
courtroom, the judge agreed.").
129. Id. at 917.

